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Abstract
Background: Given that many low income countries are heavily reliant on external assistance to fund their health
sectors the acceptance of obligations of international assistance and cooperation with regard to the right to health
(global health obligations) is insufficiently understood and studied by international health and human rights
scholars. Over the past decade Global Health Initiatives, like the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
(Global Fund) have adopted novel approaches to engaging with stakeholders in high and low income countries.
This article explores how this experience impacted on acceptance of the international obligation to (help) fulfil the
right to health beyond borders.
Methods: The authors conducted an extensive review of international human rights law literature, transnational
legal process literature, global public health literature and grey literature pertaining to Global Health Initiatives. To
complement this desk work and deepen their understanding of how and why different legal norms evolve the
authors conducted 19 in-depth key informant interviews with actors engaged with three stakeholders; the
European Union, the United States and Belgium. The authors then analysed the interviews through a transnational
legal process lens.
Results: Through according value to the process of examining how and why different legal norms evolve
transnational legal process offers us a tool for engaging with the dynamism of developments in global health
suggesting that operationalising global health obligations could advance the right to health for all.
Conclusions: In many low-income countries the health sector is heavily dependent on external assistance to fulfil
the right to health of people thus it is vital that policies and tools for delivering reliable, long-term assistance are
developed so that the right to health for all becomes more than a dream. Our research suggests that the Global
Fund experience offers lessons to build on.
Keywords: Global health initiatives, Human rights, The Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, HIV,
Right to health, Transnational legal process, Extraterritorial legal obligations
Background
“If we are to understand the significance of
international law and how it works and evolves, it is
essential to look outside of the law itself.” Oscar
Schachter [1]
The first decade of the 21st century brought substan-
tial change to the global health aid architecture;
including an increase in the number of actors and, most
notably, the emergence of well-funded dynamic global
health initiatives (GHIs), like the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the Global Fund) and
the GAVI Alliance, focused mainly on communicable
diseases and vaccines. Yet, as the world enters the sec-
ond decade of the new millennium the maternal mortal-
ity rate in Afghanistan is 400 times that of Italy, stark
evidence of the consequences of the ongoing disparity
between respect and fulfilment of basic human rights in
high and low income countries 1. The legal scholar
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Lawrence Gostin has characterized these massive health
disparities as an “unconscionable gap” noting that “the
avoidable suffering and early death among the world’s
least healthy people. . . is a breach of social justice that is
no longer ethically acceptable” [2]. The parameters of
the obligation of international assistance and cooper-
ation, as defined in the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), [3] in
addressing this disparity remain hotly debated 2.
The past decade has also witnessed legal scholars be-
ginning to address the challenges raised by the human
rights obligations of states beyond their borders, which
are referred to as extraterritorial or transnational obliga-
tions 3. With the aim of clarifying the scope of national
and international obligations under the ICESCR the Uni-
ted Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights (the Committee) has issued various general
comments, including one on the right to health [4].
General Comment 14 on the right to health and the
work of the United Nations Special Rapporteurs on the
right to health have contributed to improving the under-
standing of the importance and scope of obligations of
international assistance and cooperation with regard to
the right to health, which we shall refer to as global
health obligations 4 and 5.
The global health policy scholar Benjamin Mason
Meier argues that as the global health landscape con-
tinues to evolve the increasing influence of norms, in-
cluding human rights law, on global health policy and
institutions is evident [5]. This article explores both how
and why global health obligations founded on human
rights principles can be operationalised thus advancing
the right to health. To examine how this might occur in
practice we present the results of our study examining
the impact of one key GHI, the Global Fund, on how
different actors characterized their global health obliga-
tions on a continuum from charitable to legal obligation.
Our work was guided by our research question, “is the
evolution of the Global Fund evidence of a growing ac-
ceptance of the international obligation to (help) fulfil
the right to health beyond borders?”
During the past decades, the study of compliance has
assumed a prominent role in international legal studies 6.
Such work is clearly useful for enhancing scholars’
understanding of international law and its potential to
change state behaviour. However, we agree with Teitel
and Howse that a compliance centric approach is too
narrow leading to inadequate scrutiny and “a tendency
to oversimplify if not distort the relation of international
law to politics” [6]. It can be argued that for most legal
scholars and states “the rules” are not yet clear as regards
the nature and scope of global health obligations 7. Thus
our analysis moves beyond the strict compliance based
framework instead focusing on how and why states move
towards an understanding of what compliance with
international law entails. As such our analysis focuses on
how and why the international legal, political and social
environments in which states and non-state actors inter-
act can impact on the movement towards respect for
global health obligations. In particular we shall argue that
the traditional international law approach; focused on
general principles of international law, the role of treaties
and customary international law (the sources of inter-
national law) 8, fails to capture key elements related to
the complexity and consequences of this interactive
process.
We also employed a non-traditional legal research
methodology, exploring the engagement of the Global
Fund with different actors and stakeholders in two high
income states and one multilateral institution. Through a
series of semi-structured stakeholder interviews, we
explored if and why interaction with the Global Fund has
changed the way in which high income states characterize
their global health obligations on a spectrum from charity
to legal obligation. We argue that focusing solely on com-
pliance related behaviour and speech, would fail to cap-
ture the normative effect of international human rights
law on current practice, as it moves along the path to-
wards or away from acceptance of global health obliga-
tions. To help capture the significance of this complexity,
our work engages with a concept that first evolved in
non-legal theory -social constructivism -to help explain
how significant legal change may arise through a process
of normative internalization; specifically the acceptance of
global health obligations by states. We argue that Howard
Honghu Koh’s approach to transnational legal process and
his tripartite framework of ‘interaction, interpretation and
internalization’ help provide insights into what Berman
terms “the long process of rhetorical persuasion” [7,8].
As the global health and political landscapes are con-
stantly changing there are limitations to our “snapshot
in time” approach 9. However, we believe that this re-
search provides interesting insights into how and why
different policy stakeholders (including policy makers
and implementers, lobbyists and politicians) engage with
the concept of global health obligations. We shall argue
that the interaction high income states engage in with
respect to the Global Fund suggests the normative and
law generating potential of such behaviour and as such
this type of analysis is useful for those interested in
examining that vast terrain between international assist-
ance and cooperation as a form of charity and the ac-
ceptance of it as a legal obligation.
Methods
To improve our understanding of the impact of the Glo-
bal Fund on stakeholder thinking and behaviour; in par-
ticular that of high income states, we embarked on a
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qualitative study within a transnational legal process
paradigm 10. An extensive document review of relevant
legal, public health and grey literature informed our
questions and analysis [9]. Following our literature re-
view we developed interview questions to assist us in
further understanding stakeholder thinking and behav-
iour. We then identified key informants from health and
development stakeholders engaged with one of three
high income actors; Belgium, the executive arm of the
European Union (EU), the European Commission and
the United States. We selected the European Commission,
and the United States because they are two of the more
influential actors in so far as they rank among the Global
Fund’s biggest funders and have a representative on the
Global Fund Board. We selected Belgium because it is a
State Party to the ICESCR and we were interested in com-
paring the behaviour and motivations of a Party to
the ICESCR with the United States, which is not a
State Party 11. A second goal of these interviews was to
introduce a “reality check” into our research question
“is the evolution of the Global Fund evidence of a grow-
ing acceptance of the international obligations to (help)
fulfil the right to health beyond borders?”
For all three actors the key informants included civil
society representatives, key figures in their respective ex-
ecutive bodies and key individuals involved in the ad-
ministration and implementation of policy. For one of
the actors we interviewed an elected representative.
We conducted 19 semi-structured (eight classified as
American, seven classified as European and four classified
as Belgian) interviews with open-ended questions. We
used the following quote from the former UN Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Health, [4] Paul Hunt to
frame the questions, “if there is no legal obligation under-
pinning the human rights responsibility of international
assistance and cooperation, inescapably all international
assistance and cooperation is based fundamentally upon
charity. While such a position might have been tenable
100 years ago, it is unacceptable in the twenty-first cen-
tury” [10]. All of the interviews were recorded, anon-
ymised and transcribed verbatim. Data analysis involved
three stages, first order descriptive analysis which involved
repeated reading of the transcripts to develop familiarity
with the content of the interviews. The second-stage
involved thematic analysis in which responses, where rele-
vant, were grouped according to the core obligations
framework outlined below. Each of these themes flows
from the core obligations relating to health namely [4];
1. ‘It is particularly incumbent’ → it is a legal obligation
and not a matter of charity or political choice
2. ‘States parties and other actors in a position to assist’
→ shared responsibility which implies a form of
burden sharing is needed
3. ‘Enabling developing countries’ → focused on
countries that lack domestic capacity
4. ‘Fulfil core and other obligations’ → not limited to
AIDS, TB and malaria
Theoretical analysis
We then engaged in the third order theoretical analysis of
the interviews, in which we apply the transnational legal
process framework of interaction, interpretation and in-
ternalization to assess the second order thematic analysis
for evidence of patterns, ideas that stood out and those
responses that were novel. It is worth highlighting that
this is not a strictly linear process. A specific interaction
may lead to a specific interpretation but these steps do
not necessarily lead to internalization. Thus, as will be
described in detail below, in analysing our interviews we
looked for references to repeated instances of interaction
and interpretation that could eventually generate a norm
that may in turn become internalized 12.
Results
This section of the article explores the key concepts we
extracted from our extensive literature review. The first
subsection examines the legal obligations of inter-
national cooperation and assistance with respect to the
right to health (global health obligations) focusing on
the concept of core obligations. The second sub-section
explores the political and social context in which the
GHIs came into existence, with a particular focus on the
background, structure and functioning of the Global
Fund. In the third subsection we introduce Koh’s theory
of transnational legal process.
The right to health
To examine the legal obligations of international cooper-
ation and assistance with respect to the right to health
(global health obligations) we start with an overview of
the fundamental international law concepts key to our
analysis. Second, we review the legal basis of the right to
health in international law. Next, we address the core
content of the right to health as articulated in General
Comment 14 highlighting several key features that we
focused on in our interviews and subsequent analysis.
We shall explore how this core content may be viewed
as a partial clarification of global health obligations,
helping us to better understand the universal minimum
legal claim that all people have.
International law
Traditionally the sources of international law have been
understood to include international treaties and conven-
tions, customary practice of states and general principles
of law 8. It is generally accepted that international law can
be created through treaties (binding legal agreements
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between states) and customary law (rules that evolve over
time, becoming commonly accepted through continuous
practice) [1]. This approach implies that binding legal obli-
gations can only flow from such sources both of which re-
quire state consent. Such a conservative interpretation has
guided much, but not all, international legal scholarship
[11]. Some suggest that a more progressive approach flows
from general principles of international law arguing they
have the potential to embrace actors other than states (e.g.
NGOs and corporations). Proponents contend that if there
is a general expectation in society (e.g. human rights
norms) this can become a principle of international law
that can eventually bind a range of actors 13.
In the human rights field the impact of globalization has
led some to question the conservative, state-centric frame-
work of international law. The legal scholar Oscar Schach-
ter noted that international law “is more than a given body
of rules and obligations. It involves purposive activities
undertaken by governments directed to a variety of social
ends.” [1]. Some scholars have moved beyond the state-
centric framework to address the obligations of non-state
actors including non-governmental organizations and cor-
porations, [12-15]. Others, like Berman and Koh have
looked to a more expansive understanding of how law
develops. Our analysis moves beyond the strict compliance
based framework drawing heavily on Koh’s theory of trans-
national legal process as part of what Berman terms “the
long process of rhetorical persuasion” [7,8,11,16].
It is important for our purposes to highlight the fact
that a large and influential body of international law is
not considered to be legally binding; it is not ‘hard law’.
Such law is referred to as ‘soft law’ and includes non-
binding declarations (like the Declaration on the Right
to Development [17]); recommendations; guidelines and
the general comments issued by the United Nations
Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, dis-
cussed below. Even though soft law instruments are not
legally binding, there remains a strong expectation that
their provisions will be respected and followed by the
international community [18].
The process by which soft law instruments can over
time ‘harden’ into binding law is highly complex and
controversial. Instead of addressing the intricacies of
these arguments in relation to our topic we shall instead
adopt a transnational legal process based analysis. In
sections three and four we shall examine the potential
jurisgenerative power of interaction among multiple
international actors to examine how soft law might im-
pact on the international legal consensus, in particular
with respect to health.
Legal instruments recognizing the right to health
The first international legal document recognizing an in-
dividual right to health was the 1946 World Health
Organization (WHO) Constitution 14. It is important to
note that the WHO Constitution fails to clarify what
such adequate measures may be. The non-binding 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes a wide
range of civil, political; economic, social and cultural
rights including a reference to the right to health 15.
Subsequently, the right to the highest attainable standard
of health has been reaffirmed as a universal human right
and is enshrined in five 16 of the key international
human rights treaties.
The principle legal framework for understanding gov-
ernmental obligations relating to the right to health is
found in the ICESCR [3]. It is worth stressing that under
international law the ICESCR is an international treaty
and as such is considered binding on States parties. Art-
icle 12 of the ICESCR broadly defines the right to health
as “the right to the highest attainable standard of phys-
ical and mental health.” It provides limited guidance
regarding the scope of the right and the obligations of
States parties including reducing the stillbirth rate and
infant mortality, preventing, treating and controlling epi-
demic, endemic, occupational and other diseases and
creating conditions which would assure to all medical
service and medical attention in the event of sickness.
This guidance has been refined in later conventions and
through Committee jurisprudence including most sig-
nificantly in General Comment 14, discussed below [4].
International cooperation and assistance
The concept of international cooperation in helping to
achieve universal respect for human rights has its basis
in Articles 55 and 56 of the 1945 Charter of the United
Nations (UN Charter) 17, a formal and authoritative
foundation for future declarations and treaties with re-
spect to international cooperation.
For our purposes, it is important to note that three of
the key international human rights treaties refer to the
importance of international assistance and cooperation
with respect to achieving the rights in the treaties
namely the ICESCR (article 2.1) 18, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC) 19 and the most recent
international human rights treaty; the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 20. How-
ever as Bueno de Mesquita, Hunt and Khosla note, “Like
many elements of human rights, the parameters of inter-
national assistance and cooperation in economic, social
and cultural rights are not yet settled” [19].
General comment 14 on the right to health
As noted above General Comment 14, acts as an au-
thoritative interpretative guide to the right to health pro-
viding much needed guidance as to its normative scope
and the obligations of States parties 4. The combination
of the General Comment, the work of the UN Special
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Rapporteurs on the right to health and the ongoing work
of the Committee, including in its concluding observa-
tions to States parties, provide further clarification. In
addition to addressing the scope of the right General
Comment 14 para. 45 affirms the importance of inter-
national cooperation in achieving the right. With respect
to international cooperation it pronounces:
For the avoidance of any doubt, the Committee wishes
to emphasize that it is particularly incumbent on States
parties and other actors in a position to assist, to provide
“international assistance and cooperation, especially eco-
nomic and technical” which enable developing countries
to fulfil their core and other obligations.
This refinement of the scope of duties of ‘international
assistance and cooperation’ extended our understanding
beyond the more general statement in article 2(1) of the
ICESCR which failed to distinguish sufficiently between
national and international obligations. By clarifying that
“core obligations” relating to the right to health must be
fulfilled and that international assistance and cooper-
ation may, under certain circumstances, have a comple-
mentary or supplementary role to play in their fulfilment
the Committee advanced the interpretation that the
right to the highest attainable standard of health is a
universal right that can empower disadvantaged indivi-
duals and communities 21. In the words of Hunt and
Backman it grants “entitlements which place legal and
moral obligations on others.” [20]. However, as we shall
discuss below these entitlements are circumscribed not
unlimited but the boundaries of these limits require
greater precision.
Core obligations
The right to health is a social right and as such the obli-
gations it imposes on States parties are to be realized
progressively and in accordance with a state’s available
resources 22. The Committee addressed the contention
that “progressive realization” might be used by states to
avoid respecting, protecting and fulfilling their obliga-
tions and imply that economic and social rights had no
“immediate obligations” in General Comment 3, on the
Nature of State Parties Obligations [21]. General Com-
ment 3 elucidates a series of concepts and principles that
define the nature of states’ obligations, including the
principle of non-discrimination, the principle of non-
retrogression (a state must not take steps backwards),
and the concept of core obligations 23.
The concept of core obligations is fundamental to our
analysis as it straddles the boundary between the obliga-
tions of a State Party and the obligations of those in a
position to assist; the wealthy members of the international
community. In General Comment 14 the Committee
defined the core obligations that arise from the right to
health as including obligations to ensure access to essential
health facilities and goods and services on a non-
discriminatory basis, to develop and implement a na-
tional public health plan that addresses the health
needs of the entire population through a transparent
and participatory process and the promotion of the
preconditions of health 24. As our later analysis draws on
the specific elements of General Comment 14 we wish to
highlight that essential health services includes the
provision of essential drugs, as defined by the WHO. The
WHO list of essential drugs includes anti-retroviral (ARV)
treatment for people living with HIV.
Paragraph 47 of General Comment 14 clearly states
that these core obligations are not subject to the
principle of progressive realisation; they are of immedi-
ate effect 25. In essence they establish a floor or mini-
mum package of health services that all people in the
world have the right to immediately and which all states
must provide, irrespective of available resources 26. This
interpretation has implications for both a state that is
unable to fulfil its core obligations and those states in a
position to assist. The current reality is that most low-
income countries are too poor to fulfil the core obliga-
tions or even offer a basic package of health services for
all, which the WHO estimates would cost US$40 per
person per year 27. For some states the cost of providing
childhood vaccinations would exhaust their annual na-
tional health budget. What then is the role of states in a
position to assist?
The role of states in a position to assist (high income
states)
Given the vast global economic disparities the inter-
national community must have a role in fulfilling core
obligations on a global scale if they are to be a reality for
low income, vulnerable and disadvantaged people. In
addressing the role of states in a position to assist sev-
eral key questions must be answered. First, what is the
scope of their obligation, i.e. what does this core obliga-
tion include, and when is it satisfied? Second, when is
this obligation triggered?
As noted above, in General Comment 14 the Commit-
tee offers guidance on the scope of the obligation which
includes, among other things, developing and imple-
menting a national public health plan addressing the
health needs of the entire population through a partici-
patory and transparent process, ensuring access to es-
sential medicines, maternal, child and reproductive
health care, immunizations against major infectious dis-
eases and access on a non-discriminatory basis to health
facilities, good and services. This list does not suggest a
one-size fits all answer to the core content or obligation
and as the Joint Action and Learning Initiative makes
clear “the essential package of health goods and services
will not be the same in all countries, requiring flexibility
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and state authority (through inclusive processes to de-
fine priorities), but still within acceptable standards.” 5.
Additional work is also required to establish when this
obligation is satisfied. As we shall argue below the recent
experience with the Global Fund suggests one avenue
for answering this question.
General Comment 14 reaffirms that the state is the pri-
mary actor responsible for delivering the right to health
for those on its territory regardless of the availability of its
resources. We argue that the international obligation for
states in a position to cooperate and provide assistance is
a complementary or supplementary obligation that does
not limit or qualify the primary obligation of the state to
spend the maximum of available resources towards
achieving the right to health, and all other rights, not just
the minimum core [19,22]. Thus, in assessing the ability of
low-income countries to fulfil their core obligations, one
should not only consider a state’s domestic resources but
also resources they receive through international assist-
ance and cooperation. This interpretation is affirmed by
the comments of former UN Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Health Paul Hunt’s who noted that the list of core
obligation and obligations relating to international cooper-
ation under article 2.1 of the Covenant “should be seen as
two halves of a package” [23].
The supplementary or complementary obligation of
the international community is a limited obligation trig-
gered when a state demonstrates that despite its best
efforts it is unable (not unwilling) to fulfil its core obli-
gations 30. The question of when a state has expended
its maximum available resources is complicated, contro-
versial and can be highly political 31. Further, where do-
mestic resource constraints may prevent a state from
realizing the core content of the right to health it has
the obligation to request international assistance and co-
operation from those in a position to assist. In determin-
ing the form of such assistance and cooperation in
General Comment 19 the Committee has argued that
the core obligations are to be prioritized [24].
The remainder of this article reflects our attempt to
assess how recent experience with new global health
actors has impacted on the approach of high income
states, specifically whether this has impacted on their in-
terpretation of obligations to cooperate and provide as-
sistance to realize the right to health or even to
internalize new norms. We chose to focus on the inter-
action of global health actors (high income states, global
health advocacy groups and academics) with a fairly new
global health player, the Global Fund and we now turn
to a brief overview of its set-up and functioning.
The emergence of the Global Fund
This subsection explores the political and social context
in which the GHIs came into existence, with a particular
focus on the background, structure and functioning of
the Global Fund.
Background
As Alan Whiteside notes, AIDS is new; 2011 is the thir-
tieth anniversary of the first public report on AIDS in
the Atlanta (US) based Centers for Disease Control
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 32 [24,25]. The
initial panic and fear around AIDS stemmed in large
part from the ease of transmission and absence of treat-
ment. An HIV diagnosis was a death sentence. This pes-
simism changed in 1996 when the discovery of effective
anti-retroviral therapies (ART) was announced at the
Vancouver International AIDS Conference. For those
able to afford treatment, HIV became a serious but often
manageable chronic disease. However HIV has not
spread uniformly across the globe. It has spread most
rapidly through populations in countries which can not
afford treatment for their people and through popula-
tions whose human rights are often not-respected, in-
cluding women, men who have sex with men and
intravenous drug users 33.
In the 1980s and 1990s the push to find a treatment and
cure for HIV was spearheaded by activists from the Ameri-
can gay community; the most affected community in the
US at that time. This life or death struggle against
marginalization, discrimination and stigma resulted in a
new form of intense activism that effectively linked health
and human rights. Having pushed for pharmaceutical com-
panies to intensify research for a treatment and fought for
such treatment to be accessible in their home country (i.e.
funded by insurers, easy and reliable access for all) AIDS
activists broadened their fight to push for access to treat-
ment for all; American, Ugandan, Vietnamese or South Af-
rican. They pushed for HIV/AIDS to feature prominently
on the global agenda and at a 2000 G8 summit meeting in
Okinawa, Japan, G8 leaders acknowledged the need for sig-
nificantly greater resources to respond to AIDS, tubercu-
losis and malaria [26]. In 2001 at an African Summit on
AIDS then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called for the
creation of a global trust fund to raise additional money. In
June 2001 a UN General Assembly Special Session on
AIDS committed to creating such a fund [27]. A transi-
tional working group was formed and in January 2002 the
permanent secretariat of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund) was established in
Geneva, Switzerland. Three months later the Global Fund
Board approved the first round of grants to 36 countries.
The Global Fund
For our purposes several key features of the Global Fund
are of interest namely its role as a financial enabler, not
as an implementer, the fact it is a global public/private
partnership and its emphasis on transparency.
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As noted above, the Global Fund was created in 2002
“to dramatically increase resources to fight three of the
world's most devastating diseases, and to direct those
resources to areas of greatest need.” 34. It is an inter-
national financing mechanism that funds programs
through grants not loans; to address three diseases, HIV,
tuberculosis and malaria. As such it finances vertical
interventions that target three diseases not health sys-
tems as a whole. It is not a norm setting body; this is
generally the role of the WHO.
Like the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisa-
tions (GAVI) Alliance; the Global Fund approach is in-
novative in that it is a partnership among governments,
the private sector (including pharmaceutical companies
and foundations like the Gates Foundation), civil society
and affected communities [28]. This approach is
reflected at both the global and country level.
The Global Fund is committed to the transparency
and accountability of its operations; including those of
grant recipients and grant contributors. It is a result-
driven organization and provides easy access (i.e. it is
available online) to its funding data. It also publishes
details about the pledges and financing it receives; as
well as details about its grants and implementation of
these grants. This transparency is vital as it allows civil
society activists to monitor what their governments
commit to and hold them to account.
The Global Fund does not link a particular donor to a
particular project or country. Instead it pools funds from
high income countries funds and funds proposals based
on merit not political considerations [29]. In theory the
modus operandi of the Global Fund should help to en-
hance country ownership of projects. Instead of drafting
project proposals for countries the Global Fund Board
issues calls for proposals; countries apply for funds through
a national-level Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM)
which includes representatives from governments, multilat-
eral and bilateral agencies, non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs), people living with the diseases, academic
institutions, and private businesses 35. The proposals are
reviewed by the independent Technical Review Panel,
which makes recommendations to the Global Fund Board.
The Global Fund Board includes representatives of both
high income countries and recipient governments, NGOs
from the South and the North, the private sector and
communities affected by the diseases. In theory, this
highly inclusive structure should allow for a greater bal-
ance between the interests of high income countries and
low income countries 36.
Once the Global Fund Board approves a proposal, a
grant agreement is signed with a Principal Recipient, pro-
posed by the CCM. A Local Fund Agent oversees imple-
mentation, acts as an independent auditor of expenditure
and activities, and liaises with the Global Fund Secretariat.
The Global Fund Secretariat oversees the day to day
operations among other things managing the proposal
applications process, raising money from the public and
private sectors and reporting to the Board and the public
on Global Fund activities. Attempts to formalize high in-
come countries burden sharing have not yet been success-
ful 37.
The Global Fund’s mandate does not refer to the right
to health. It was established to act as an international fi-
nancing mechanism to help finance the fight against three
diseases. It is structured to be flexible, efficient, country-
driven and results focused. It is important to note that
the Global Fund does not claim to play a role in fulfilling
the right to health. References to human rights in its
documents tend to be limited to discussion of principles
of non-discrimination. The analysis we shall develop in
the sections 3 and 4 shall attempt to show that although
the Global Fund is silent about its role as a financing in-
strument that allows countries to fulfil the right to health
it has to a certain extent played such a role.
Moving beyond compliance-transnational legal process
Schachter asserted that “Much compliance can be attrib-
uted to institutionalized habit; officials follow the rules
as a matter of practice,” [1] As we have noted above it
can be argued that for most legal scholars and states
“the rules” are not yet clear as regards the nature and
scope of global health obligations. In section three we
explore how engagement in the international political
process can shape the evolution of the international con-
sensus on particular legal obligations. Our analysis thus
moves beyond the strict compliance based framework
drawing heavily on Koh’s theory of transnational legal
process [16], [7], [8].
International law-moving beyond compliance 38
Over thirty years ago in his book How Nations Behave
the American Professor Louis Henkin claimed that “al-
most all nations observe almost all principles of inter-
national law and almost all of their obligations all of the
time” [30]. Challenging or supporting his assertion is
certainly an interesting worthwhile field of study. How-
ever taking our inspiration from Koh we find the richer
questions to be-why do nation states and other trans-
national actors obey international human rights law, and
why do they sometimes disobey it [16], [7], [8]? As such
we have chosen to move beyond examining compliance
alone and instead focus on the process by which legal
actors come to internalize and comply with legal norms
or participate in the generation of new norms, namely
transnational legal process 39.
When examining compliance most international legal
and international relations scholars have focused their
analysis on two distinct mechanisms by which law changes
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state practice; the realist paradigm which examines power
and coercion and that of persuasion 40. The persuasion
school has developed in several different directions. It
includes scholars who focus on the long-term self-interest
of states in obeying the law, and those who attempt to
capture the powerful influence of ideas, norms and social
forces that shape state behaviour, including compliance
[31]. Several liberal international relations scholars have
contributed Kantian inspired compliance theories tied to
the role of a law abiding national identity 41.
The constructivists have taken a different approach ar-
guing that norms play a key role in forming national iden-
tity and that compliance with international law may form
part of a nation’s identity [32,33]. The engagement of
international relations with social constructivism began in
the 1980s as a reaction to the neorealist focus on the dis-
tribution of power and national interest as the drivers of
state behaviour and the rejection of the idea that anarchy
leads to self-help [34]. Alexander Wendt, a leader in
bringing constructivism into international relations stres-
ses that it is not simply about adding the role of ideas to
existing theories of international relations. Martha Finne-
more’s work extends the focus to the norms of inter-
national society and the way in which they shape state
interests and identity. She argues that international norms
promoted by international organizations can influence na-
tional behaviour. Her ground-breaking case-study on the
role of the World Bank argues how the acceptance by
developing states of the World Bank discourse on poverty
alleviation as a norm of economic policy can not be
explained solely by a neorealist focus on power [32,33].
Koh claims that these explanations of why nations
obey or comply with international law; power, national
interest, national identity and identity formation, are
both persuasive and complementary but that they fail to
fully explain why nations obey international law. He
argues that a full answer must address the importance of
interaction, interpretation of international norms and
domestic internalization of international norms as deter-
minants of compliance [16], [7], [8]. Thus to understand
the complexities of why nations comply with inter-
national law including, international human rights law,
Koh claims we also need to understand the role of trans-
national legal process 42.
Transnational legal process
The theory of transnational legal process can be traced
to what has been termed the “new” New Haven School
of international law that emerged in the 1990s 43. Its
approach and focus is inspired by the original New
Haven School which as Janet Koven Levit summarized;
“offered a kind of socio-legal realism to combat the
power-based realism that had dominated the early Cold
War period” 44. Koh and colleagues were also influenced
by legal pluralism and the work of Robert Cover, who
ironically enough, did not focus on international law.
However as a legal pluralist Cover argued that law is con-
stantly constructed through a contest waged among vari-
ous norm-generating communities [35]. The other major
influence was the changes in the international political
arena, foremost increased globalization and the rise of
myriad transnational actors. As such the theory moves
beyond the traditional state-centric model to look at the
world as one of multiple normative communities which
shape the emergence of legal norms to varying degrees.
As our analysis shall be guided by Koh’s definition of
transnational legal process it is useful to reproduce it in
full. For Koh:
Transnational legal process describes the theory and
practice of how public and private actors-nation-states,
international organizations, multinational enterprises,
non-governmental organizations and private individuals-
interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and
international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultim-
ately, internalize rules of transnational law [16], [7], [8].
Koh argues that transnational legal process has four
distinct features. Firstly, it is non-traditional, as dis-
cussed above it moves beyond the traditional dichoto-
mies of public/private and domestic/international.
Second, it embraces a non-statist approach, acknowledg-
ing that actors involved in the process include both state
and non-state actors. Third, it is a dynamic process that
is multidirectional in so far as the process of transform-
ation can be from non-state actor to state and back. Fi-
nally, it is also normative. The process of interaction
generates new norms which are interpreted, enforced
and internalized. For our analysis the salient feature of
transnational legal process is the fact the theory
embraces the normativity of the process 45.
Koh stresses that internalization takes place at three
levels; social, political and legal. Social internalization
refers to a norm that is widely accepted by the public as
legitimate and results in general obedience (e.g. global ra-
cial equality). Political internalization occurs when a norm
is accepted by political elites and forms part of policy (e.g.
development assistance). Finally legal internalization
occurs when a norm is incorporated into the domestic
legal system through legislation, judicial interpretation or
executive action. The interaction among these different
forms of internalization can be complex 46.
Discussion
Transnational legal process and the Global Fund
In this section we explore a practical example assessing
how ongoing engagement with an international institution
like the Global Fund can impact on the international
legal consensus. We use Koh’s tripartite framework of
interaction, interpretation and internalization to analyze
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how and why engagement with the Global Fund has, or
has not had any impact on the nature of the engagement
of high income states with their global health obligations.
A New forum for stakeholder interaction
Applying the transnational legal process theoretical
framework to our research enhances our ability to
understand why different actors take the decisions they
take with respect to their interaction with the Global
Fund. To understand how our case study on the Global
Fund, can be understood through the transnational legal
process lens consider the following.
By the mid 1990s the response to the global AIDS epi-
demic was becoming an important political and human
rights issue. The creation of a new institution in 2001,
the Global Fund, to help disburse funds so as to start
down the path towards universal access to anti-retroviral
(ARV) treatment was welcomed by AIDS activists. From
the transnational legal process perspective the creation
of the Global Fund provided a new forum for stake-
holder interaction. It is not part of the United Nations
system, nor is it an arm of the WHO or World Bank. It
provided an opportunity for interaction that would pro-
voke a reaction-an ongoing dialogue and interpretation
of what countries in a position to assist should do to re-
spond to HIV, tuberculosis and malaria.
The institutional structure of this new global institu-
tion was and is unique (see details in section two). The
requirements of different funding rounds evolve accord-
ing to scientific evidence on best practice and stake-
holder demands. The specific forum for interaction and
decision-making, the Global Fund Board, has a novel
structure in comparison to traditional development
actors like the World Bank or bilateral development as-
sistance actors. The inclusion of private sector, state and
civil society actors from both high and low income states
on the Global Fund Board reflects the growing role of
non-state actors on the global stage. Gostin and Sridhar
affirm the importance of this broader approach arguing
that the WHO, the global health norm setting agency,
would be more effective by “giving voice and representa-
tion to key stakeholders, including philanthropies, busi-
nesses, public/private partnership and civil society” [28].
As such the Global Fund exemplifies each of the fea-
tures of transnational legal process outlined above. It is a
both a non-traditional, non-statist actor in the develop-
ment field bringing together a wide-range of actors that
often sit on opposite sides of the table; for example civil
society and the private sector. It is dynamic and rapidly
evolving to respond to demands of states as well as non-
state actors. Finally, we shall argue that our interviews
suggest that this interaction is normative and potentially
jurisgenerative. As Koh argues, “Transnational legal
process matters because it increasingly influences law
and policies that govern us, particularly through pro-
cesses by which international law and policies become
domesticated into US law and polices” 43.
Examining the process-the interviews
This analysis draws from 19 semi-structured interviews,
conducted from June 2010 to February 2011, with stake-
holders with ties to two high income states and those
who represent or lobby key European Union (EU) insti-
tutions, and in particular the European Commission.
The interviews lead us to insights that move beyond the
nature of that process to examine the normativity of that
process arguing that the practice of ongoing engagement
with the Global Fund suggests the potential “jurisgenera-
tive” or law-creating effect that such a process can have
on conduct 49.
Our discussion centres on the interviewees’ responses,
which were grouped according to the core obligations
framework outlined below. Each of these themes flows
from the core obligations relating to health namely;
1. ‘It is particularly incumbent’ → it is a legal obligation
and not a matter of charity or political choice
2. ‘States parties and other actors in a position to assist’
→ shared responsibility which implies a form of
burden sharing is needed
3. ‘Enabling developing countries’ → focused on
countries that lack domestic capacity
4. ‘Fulfil core and other obligations’ → not limited to
AIDS, TB and malaria
We then apply the transnational legal process frame-
work of interaction, interpretation and internalization to
the grouped responses looking for evidence of patterns,
ideas that stood out and those responses that were novel.
Interaction and interpretation-the Global Fund and core
obligations
Koh suggests that the interaction between states and the
transnational legal process can encourage compliance
with international human rights obligations [16], [7], [8].
In the following sub-sections the interviews shall serve
as the basis for evaluating the impact of the Global Fund
on the degree of acceptance of international obligations
of assistance and cooperation to help fulfil a limited
element of the core content of the right to health. Again,
we reiterate that there are limitations to this approach
but believe it enhance understanding of how global
health obligations can be operationalised.
International assistance and cooperation is a legal
obligation and not a matter of charity or political choice
The Committee has clarified that the core content of the
right to health includes the provision of medicines on
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the WHO list of essential medicines (this includes
ARVs). As discussed above the cost of purchasing and
providing access to ARVs is beyond the financial reach
of many countries and thus to provide such treatment
they must engage in international assistance and cooper-
ation. Our research attempted to ascertain how ongoing
interaction with the Global Fund impacted on the differ-
ent actors’ views on the legal nature of global health
obligations. It is worth recalling from our discussion in
section one that legal scholars are divided as to whether
such an obligation exists: some arguing yes; others yes
but is not practicable; and others that it simply does not
exist. We did not expect to hear high income state
representatives affirm the existence of such an obliga-
tion. We found that a large majority (18) of the intervie-
wees rejected the idea that international assistance and
cooperation was based on charity. The majority did not
take a firm position on the legal obligation question
often blurring the line between moral obligation, legal
obligation and the concept of solidarity.
One US academic noted that the structure of the Global
Fund; in particular its transparency, “has created expecta-
tions that go in the direction of obligations, not legal obli-
gations but obligations that are more fixed without a
doubt.” A Senior European Commission official echoed
this view of the Global Fund as moving beyond charity
stating that “because the funding is linked to vital services,
then even less politicians are ready to be potentially
accused of dropping vital treatments. So it has, I don’t
know if it’s duty, but it has given them a sense of responsi-
bility.” Another US academic noted “the Global Fund is
more transparent, because the funds are entering into an
account and there is a transparency in how those funds
are used to meet the goal of funding once a country passes
it over from their account to the Global Fund account.”
These quotes suggest that both the transparent nature
of the interaction and the clear link between input (i.e.
funding) and results (i.e. access to treatment) have
helped shaped the interpretation of the obligation. We
would suggest that the Global Fund has made it easier
for high income states to identify the obligation they are
seeking to fulfil (e.g. X number of people on ARVs by
year Y) and made their role in this process more visible.
With respect to transparency the above-mentioned
quote from a US academic is telling. Thus the transpar-
ency of the Global Fund decision making process helps
shape the interpretation of the responsibility. Those that
participate in the Global Fund open themselves up to
scrutiny. The amount high income states contribute is
public knowledge and NGO watchdogs like the Global
Fund Observer, ensure that this information remains
easily available [36]. Shining the bright light of transpar-
ency on interactions may thus impact on how they come
to be interpreted in the longer term.
In terms of the link between funding and treatment
(i.e. results) several interviewees echoed the European
Commission official. Perhaps the Global Fund provides a
partial answer to the long-standing question of how a
country in a position to assist can discharge this obliga-
tion. Through ongoing interaction at the Global Fund
Board decisions are taken as to what types of proposals
will be funded in the field of HIV, tuberculosis and
malaria. These decisions may be viewed as interpretations
of the international community’s common but undifferen-
tiated responsibility for a limited portion of global health
rights. Thus the ongoing interaction has led to a new in-
terpretation and the Global Fund can act as the vehicle
to help discharge this limited obligation and countries
that participate know their participation is visible in the
international community.
A Belgian elected representative noted that in theory
there is a legal obligation, citing a recent parliamentary
resolution as further proof of the recognition of the obli-
gation. However the individual noted the practice is dif-
ferent stating, “when it comes to implementing we are
not doing so well.” This view was echoed by a Belgian
civil society actor who stated, “Well, for the moment, the
contributions are still voluntary. So the whole issue on
really taking responsibility is still open, I would say, ex-
cept for the public opinion and so on that you can apply
on it. I think for the moment it does not work at all.”
The majority of the non-state representative respon-
dents (e.g. academics, NGO representatives) viewed con-
tributions to the Global Fund as a legal obligation but
noted that their respective governments did not see it
this way. Several statements suggest that there is some-
thing about interaction with the Global Fund that has
changed the perceptions and actions of certain actors,
e.g. the European politicians who may now feel more
responsible for decisions relating to global health obliga-
tions We would argue that our interviews and research
suggest that the process of interaction and interpretation
related to the Global Fund has not (yet) led to the social
or political internalization of global health obligations as
legal obligations as opposed to matters of charity or pol-
itical choice.
Shared responsibility, implying that a form of burden
sharing is needed
As mentioned above the issue of how much a particular
state owes to another state is a highly complex unre-
solved issue. The General Comment does not provide
useful guidance. The Global Fund pools high income
state resources which allows for a form of burden shar-
ing. Unfortunately attempts to develop a burden sharing
template were abandoned. As noted above the Global
Fund is highly transparent so activists know what their
governments have pledged and whether or not they have
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kept their promises. High income state governments can
also point to their support to gain political goodwill.
We wanted to understand whether the experience of
civil society working with high income states and mul-
tiple other stakeholders on the Global Fund, including
the Board, would contribute to a sense of burden shar-
ing. We also sought to understand whether or not they
saw the Global Fund as an appropriate tool for dischar-
ging a common responsibility. We wondered how the
process of interaction and peer-pressure on countries to
pay their pledged contributions would impact on the
notion of a shared responsibility. Perhaps the interac-
tions would lead to a new interpretation of how to dis-
charge a common but undifferentiated responsibility?
Would the transparency of the Global Fund allow acti-
vists to hold high income states to pay what they
pledge perhaps leading to the internalization of this
responsibility?
We asked the interviewees whether their experience
with the Global Fund has fostered a sense of burden
sharing between high income states. A representative of
an American NGO noted that “There was a premise in
the original formulation of the Global Fund that the US
would pay a fair share of the global cost, and that is was
based on some other equitable contribution assessments.”
A European NGO representative noted that “One of the
instruments in which the burden sharing is doing very
good work is the Global Fund. It is a very concrete insti-
tution with a process that permits a kind of accountabil-
ity. It’s not enough but it’s kind of a base.” One former
member of the US administration stated that “I think the
notion of peer pressure is a figment of people’s imagin-
ation.” Another European NGO representative commen-
ted on the limitations of peer pressure “why should
France pay double of their fair share because Japan is
not paying, this kind of pressure could be more normal,
more accepted in diplomacy because in my conversation
with some Spanish diplomats they say, “I can’t say Japan
oh pay because I paid.” And I think it’s first of all, it’s an
issue of culture.” One US NGO representative identified
a risk with pooling cautioning “there’s a risk that if a
country is providing what they should be providing and
everyone else is providing a whole lot less, that that one
country will have an excuse for scaling back.”
The majority of interviewees made clear that burden
sharing and peer pressure, both of which flow from the
Global Fund model, are unique key elements of the
interaction between stakeholders. One US NGO repre-
sentative commented on how the pooling mechanism it-
self generates a sense of obligation observing, “So my
sense is that yes, I think the Global Fund mechanism
makes more sense because particularly if there’s a system
of obligations as opposed to a system of donations, which
is very, very different.”
The responses suggest that this process of interaction
changes the interpretation and the conversation sur-
rounding who owes what to whom in terms of contribu-
tions. Further, what came through clearly from the
interviews was that the transparency of the Global Fund
process allows advocates to keep up their pressure on
the high income states. As no burden sharing targets
have been agreed it is hard to argue that burden sharing
has been internalized at any level.
Countries that lack domestic capacity
This issue goes to the heart of who the primary duty
bearer is and how to strengthen the ability of countries
that lack domestic resources to fulfil rights. As noted
above, from an international health perspective the Global
Fund response should be driven by countries that lack
resources. In reality, countries that are unable to fulfil
their obligations relating to three specific diseases can
submit nationally developed plans to the Global Fund.
However the plans must fulfil Global Fund criteria.
In this phase of our analysis we moved beyond asses-
sing whether interaction had helped to generate a new
interpretation of how to facilitate countries that lack do-
mestic capacity to fulfil their obligations 48. Here we
sought to understand how interaction at the Global
Fund might have impacted on the issue of national own-
ership and how this concept was interpreted and even
internalized. We sought to understand whether the Glo-
bal Fund model was viewed as more country driven by
high income state actors.
One Belgian NGO representative commented that
“The Global Fund is open, much more open to the
demands of the country, the needs of the country and is
less, restrictive in what can be requested. . .So it’s much
more flexible and much more contributing really to dif-
ferences on the field to the specific possibilities of getting
recurrent funds financed.” In discussing the Global Fund
in-country presence one EU NGO representative noted,
“The CCM works better in some countries than in others
but that is a reflection of the political realities of those
actual countries in the way in which they allow and em-
power their citizens overall not just within the health pol-
icy making.” A US NGO representative commented,
“The Global Fund includes so much national level par-
ticipation, including civil society, it’s a way of building
sustainability at the country level. And if it’s done right,
increasing local capacity that ultimately ideally would
decrease the need for international assistance. So I do
think that the Global Fund presented donor states, in-
cluding the US government, with an alternate way of
viewing their engagement, so that it’s not just charitable
but that it’s also ideally more empowering.”
If one consequence of interaction is the interpretation
of how to actualize human rights norms the interviews
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suggest that the flexibility and transparency of the Glo-
bal Fund allow for debate about national responsibility
including the difficult issue of disparities between states
in terms of both ability and willingness to engage with
their obligations. We would argue that the internaliza-
tion of the norm of country ownership has progressed
due to the ongoing interaction and interpretation
process. Further, that norm is more internalized at the
political level that is accepted by political elites than a
social or legal norm. This process can not be discon-
nected from concurrent developments including the
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness which aims at in-
creasing country ownership 49. Thus we would not argue
that the Global Fund was the driver of change but that it
played a role in the transnational legal process that has
helped a new norm emerge.
‘Fulfil core and other obligations’→ not limited to AIDS, TB
and malaria
As noted in the discussion on the right to health above,
realizing the right to health for all requires that States
parties take appropriate actions relating to the right to
health and the social determinants of health including
sanitation and education. Thus a disease specific model,
like the Global Fund, as an approach to achieving the
right to health clearly has significant limitations and po-
tentially negative implications 50. Interaction at the Global
Fund had for some highlighted the contradictions of a
disease focused approach to realizing the right to health.
The large majority of interviewees clearly recognized
the limitations of a three disease model yet appeared
able to look beyond this limitation. One EU NGO repre-
sentative summarized what we heard from a majority of
interviewees, “When we start to talk about the people
with HIV having a right to life and a right to health, we
of course cannot speak only about HIV. You need to
speak more broadly about the right to health there. Be-
cause why should people with HIV have a special right if
people with Malaria or children dying from diarrhoea
and so on. Why should HIV be special in that sense?” An
EU official noted; “we have been consistently trying to
support the progressive move of the Global Fund to go be-
yond these diseases.” A US NGO representative noted,
“with the whole addition of the health system strengthen-
ing into this mix it raises that contradiction because how
can you have indicators around health system strength-
ening that are health system oriented but with HIV
money. And yet you’re expecting to show the HIV results
as well and if you go through a vertical financing mech-
anism and a vertical reporting mechanism, how do you
build up the wider health system?”
One EU NGO representative cautioned against
expanding the Global Fund model arguing that the Glo-
bal Fund is far from pursuing a rights based approach “I
mean you have the classic example of the government
that gets funding to look at HIV AIDS, with regards to
communities of men who have sex with men, and has a
policing system that criminalizes their actions, and a
practice of basically violating their rights often through
police brutality.” Another EU NGO representative also
expressed concern about expanding the mandate of the
Global Fund noting, “Perhaps we must be cautious there-
fore in thinking about a Global Fund for health because
what motivates high income states with the same type of
input and expected outputs from those inputs within a
social Global Fund, do we want that form of quasi im-
perialism to rule the social sector so strongly? And we
must be brutally honest that the reason the big states
continue to support the IMF and continue to support the
Bank is the same reason that they want to seek positions
on the Security Council, it is all about the power and in-
fluence which is also why the emerging economies have
wanted to have a role within the Bretton Woods
institutions.”
The majority of interviewees suggest that the stake-
holders have not internalized the view that the Global
Fund, as currently structured, is a tool for fulfilling the
core contents relating to the right to health. However,
the majority recognized its value for the three diseases
and several mentioned the potential of the Global Fund
approach for fulfilling the right to health more broadly.
Thus in this instance repeated interaction advanced an
interpretation that the Global Fund should not be lim-
ited to three diseases as this is a limited understanding
of what global health obligations entail.
The Global Fund and norm creation
The precise nature and scope of global health obligations
is unclear and needs to be better understood. As such
neither states in a position to cooperate and assist (high
income states) nor those with a duty to request assist-
ance and cooperation to fulfil their obligations fully
understand the implications of global health obligations.
However, as discussed above, ensuring universal access
to anti-retroviral treatment (ARVs) for people living with
HIV is clearly a core obligation related to the right to
health that many states can not fulfil due to resource
constraints. The Global Fund was established as a ve-
hicle to finance such treatment. Through the process of
interaction at the Global Fund Board, in negotiating,
implementing and assessing grants we would argue new
social and political norms were created. Social norms
that recognized the obligation to provide universal access
to ARVs and political norms recognizing the potential of
a burden sharing approach to achieve this aim 51 and 52.
Further, our research suggests that different stake holders
have, to differing degrees; come to internalize these new
norms through ongoing engagement with the Global
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Fund. However the internalization of these norms by
high income states does not appear to have occurred.
Using a transnational legal process approach to under-
standing how the global legal system develops encourages
us to value the impact of interaction and internalization
on norm creation and ultimately compliance. Koh
argues that the predictive capacity of transnational
legal process pushes us to conclude that nations will
come into compliance with international norms if
transnational legal processes are aggressively triggered by
other transnational actors forcing interaction in inter-
national forums capable of generating norms that are then
internalized [16], [7], [8].
However if an enhanced degree of political responsibil-
ity is internalized this can shape both political practice
and over time lead to increased commitment to the
norm and thus in the long-term shape the approach to
the obligation, i.e. as legal not simply moral, and lead to
its legal internalization. Few high income states appear
to have sufficient social and political internalization of
the international cooperation norm as to internalize it
legally through legislation 53. However the act of legally
enshrining the international cooperation norm does not
necessarily imply that future international cooperation
will be aimed at fulfilling human rights obligations be-
yond borders.
We would argue that through continued interaction
with the Global Fund and related constituencies some
high income states have started to understand how they
can discharge one element of their global health obliga-
tions. However the global economic downturn that began
in 2008 has challenged the transnational legal process
allowing states to step back from political internalization.
It is here that advocacy and in some cases national or
transnational public law litigation have a key role to
play in harnessing the political will required to shape
government policy and ultimately push those govern-
ments in a position to assist towards legal internaliza-
tion and compliance.
Conclusions
In this paper we have argued that the tendency of legal
scholars to focus solely on compliance related behaviour
and speech, fails to capture the normative effect of inter-
national human rights law on the current practice of
global health actors, as it moves along the path towards
or away from acceptance of global health obligations.
As noted above, the following statement by Paul Hunt
framed our interviews “if there is no legal obligation
underpinning the human rights responsibility of inter-
national assistance and cooperation, inescapably all
international assistance and cooperation is based funda-
mentally upon charity. While such a position might have
been tenable 100 years ago, it is unacceptable in the
twenty-first century." [10]. The Committee has asserted
that international cooperation for development is a bind-
ing obligation under the ICESCR [4]. This authoritative
interpretation has been largely rejected by many high
income states that fear its potential implications 54.
Hunt et al. note that many low income states agree with
the Committee’s interpretation that the human rights re-
sponsibility of international assistance and cooperation
places binding legal obligations on states; those requiring
assistance and those in a position to assist [19].
We suggest that our case study shows how the trans-
national legal process of interaction, interpretation and
internalization of international human rights norms can
lead to enhanced compliance in the absence of new “hard
law”. In particular our research has suggested that out-
right resistance to the international legal obligation to co-
operate and provide development assistance to realize the
right to health, may be eroded if states in a position to as-
sist can be shown how this obligation can be discharged.
Through ongoing interaction at the Global Fund (mul-
tiple meetings over the past decade) high income states
came to understand how this limited element of their ob-
ligation could be discharged. As such they came to a new
interpretation of how to engage with their obligation,
namely contributing to the Global Fund. The engagement
of civil society in this process was important as it acted as
a watchdog for both high income states and low income
states. The albeit limited transparency of the Global Fund
allowed for this type of interaction with the evolving
norm. Thus our research supports Berman’s contention
that, “to the extent that international human rights are
now an important element of global legal consciousness;
it is because of a long process of rhetorical persuasion,
treaty codification, and other forms of “soft law” slowly
changing the international consensus, not because of
positivist decree.” [11]. No new hard law has been pro-
claimed but a consistent pattern of interaction and pledg-
ing new funds suggests some high income states are
moving towards interpreting their funding of the Global
Fund as a vehicle for discharging their responsibility
related to three global diseases.
We have argued that a process focused lens suggests
avenues for exploring how acceptance and respect for
norms evolves. Thus even while uncertainty as to the
precise scope of global health obligations exists we sug-
gest it is worth examining state practice and interaction
and that the knowledge gained can help shape research
and advocacy agendas 55. As such, we hope that our re-
search provides a limited response to Schrecker et al’s
plea for more research on how the acts, policies and
omissions of rich, powerful countries affect economic
and social rights beyond their borders 56.
Although we have focused our attention on how com-
plex international human rights obligations can be
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operationalised we do not intend to suggest that state
and non-state actors have or have not become more
compliant with their international human rights obliga-
tions. International human rights law has a key role to
play in addressing these violations by identifying the
entitlements of individual rights holders and the corre-
sponding obligations of diverse duty bearers. The
strength of human rights lies in its empowerment of
people to claim their rights and to hold duty bearers ac-
countable for failures but this requires the political will
to develop robust accountability mechanisms [37].
Drawing from the logic underpinning Cover’s defence
of the Nuremberg trials which was based on “the cap-
acity of the event to project a new legal meaning into
the future” [35] we question whether the Global Fund
has created a degree of “new legal meaning” in the area
of global health obligations. The future direction of the
Global Fund is uncertain but as Bob Deacon wrote: “The
Global Fund might be taken as an example of how glo-
bal innovative redistribution mechanisms are being
established” [38].
Although far from perfect, the Global Fund has high-
lighted the power of transparency and multi-stakeholder
partnerships in creating new legal meaning including
how to engage in global health cooperation. This legal
meaning is free for others to build on in the future.
Endnotes
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Millennium Development Goals (MDG) with targets to
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2015 and to achieve universal access to reproductive
health. The Human Rights Council identifies a range of
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of international assistance and cooperation and health
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the volume of ref. [41].
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AnnualReports.aspx]. Hunt’s reports included missions
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maternal mortality. Grover has also chosen to explore
his mandate broadly examining guidelines for pharma-
ceutical companies in relation to access to medicines.
[http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Health/Pages/
SRRightHealthIndex.aspx].
5 We shall use the term global health obligations to
refer to the international legal obligations found in inter-
national human rights treaties including the Inter-
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yet fully defined but has been examined by the UN Spe-
cial Rapporteur on the Right to Health, the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and other legal
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on National and Global Responsibility for Health (JALI)
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sponsibility of all states and that of the international
community with respect to the right to health and “clar-
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7 As noted above General Comment 14, the work of
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ciples%20-%20FINAL.pdf]
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general principles of law common to most legal systems.
Statue of the International Court of Justice. 59 Stat.
1055, 33 U. N.T.S. 993; 1945.
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Fund. In response the Global Fund created an Independ-
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high income states have responded positively to the re-
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Fund Board to “cancel” (postpone) a pledging round
(Round 11). The ongoing global financial crisis was
blamed for this decision which will have a huge impact
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of confidence in the Global Fund model or is truly a re-
sult of the crisis. For details see Aidspan: The Global
Fund Observer, Issue 158, 20 September, 2011. [http://
www.aidspan.org/documents/gfo/GFO-Issue-158.htm]
10 For methodological background see ref. [44]. For an
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has signed but not ratified the ICESCR. All European
Union member states have ratified or acceded to the
ICESCR but the European Commission is not a party to
the ICESCR. For details concerning contributions and
pledges to the Global Fund please see:[http://www.the-
globalfund.org/en/about/donors/public/]
12 Whether or not the internalization of a norm should
be viewed as compliance like behaviour or jurisgenera-
tive, i.e. creating a new norm that is to be complied with
is beyond the scope of this essay.
13 The UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food,
Olivier De Schutter, observes that the International
Court of Justice encourages the recognition of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights as a general
principle of international law noting that as far back as
the Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Northern Ireland-Albania)(I.C.J. Reports 1949, 4
at 22) the courts mentioned “obligations. . . based . . . on
certain general and well-recognised principles” cited in
ref. [46]. Also see ref. [47].
14 World Health Organization: Constitution of the
World Health Organization, 14 U.N.T.S. 186, 1946. The
preamble proclaims that the enjoyment of the highest at-
tainable standard of health is a fundamental right of
every human being without distinction, and that govern-
ments are responsible “for the health of their peoples
which can be fulfilled only by the provision of adequate
health and social measures.”
15 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217 (III) 1948, UN Doc A/810, p. 71. Article 25.1 states
that, “everyone has the right to a standard of living ad-
equate for the health and well-being of himself and of
his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services.”
16 International convention on the elimination of all
forms of racial discrimination, G.A. Res. 20/2106; UN
GAOR 2106 (X) 1966: U.N.T.S. 195; International coven-
ant on economic, social and cultural rights, G.A. Res.
21/2200A, UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49. UN Doc A/
6316 1966. Convention on the elimination of all forms of
discrimination against women, G.A. Res. 34/180, UN
GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46 at 193 UN Doc.A/34/46
1979. Convention on the rights of the child, G.A. Res. 44/25,
UN GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 166, UN Doc.
A/44/25 1989. Convention on the rights of persons with
disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106; 2006, UN GAOR, 61st
Sess. Annex I, UN Doc. A/RES/61/106 (2006).
17 Charter of the United Nations, signed 1945, 59 Stat.
1031, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945. [http://www.un.org/
en/documents/charter/chapter9.shtml] Article 55 (c) notes
that the UN shall promote “universal respect for, and ob-
servance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language or reli-
gion.” Article 56 also uses mandatory language to refer ex-
plicitly to the duties of members to take joint and separate
action to achieve the purposes set out in article 55.
18 Article 2.1 of the ICESCR states “Each State Party
to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, indi-
vidually and through international assistance and co-
operation, especially economic and technical, to the
maximum of its available resources.”
19 Articles 4 and 23- specifically referencing the im-
portance of international cooperation and assistance in,
inter alia, achieving the right to health. Article 23(4) of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), affirms
that “States Parties undertake to promote and encourage
international cooperation with a view to achieving pro-
gressively the full realization of the right recognized in
the present article. In this regard, particular account
shall be taken of the needs of developing countries”. For
a rich analysis please see ref. [48].
20 Article 32 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities notes that States Parties, “recognize the
importance of international cooperation and its promo-
tion, in support of national efforts for the realisation of
the purposes and objectives of the present Convention,
and will undertake appropriate and effective measures in
this regard.”
21 Commenting on this issue in 1987 (prior to the
1990 release of General Comment 3 on the nature of
States parties’ obligations), Philip Alston noted, “A lo-
gical implication of the use of the terminology of rights.
In other words, there would be no justification for ele-
vating a claim to the status of a right (with all the con-
notations that concept is generally assumed to have) if
its normative content could be so indeterminate as to
allow for the possibility that the rights holders possess
non minimum entitlement, in the absence of which a
State Party is to be considered in violation of its obliga-
tions.” p. 352–353 in [49].
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22 For example Article 24(4) of the CRC recognizes
that as with other economic and social rights, the rights
enshrined in the CRC will be achieved progressively and
not immediately.
23 The minimum core approach as developed by the
Committee has generated controversy. Katharine Young
provides a challenging critique of the minimum core ap-
proach see ref. [50]. John Tobin labels the minimum
core elucidated in General Comment 14 to be “unprin-
cipled and impractical. The long list of measures
required of states is so onerous that few states, if any,
are likely to adopt such an approach.” (p 48) [51].
24 An example of the importance of the core obliga-
tion to develop a national health plan is evidenced in the
work of major global health actors; for example, the
Health Systems Funding Platform (bringing together the
GAVI Alliance, the Global Fund and the World Bank
and coordinated by the WHO) requires that a national
health plan (assessed and refined through a joint assess-
ment process) serve as the basis for all health related
funding that it coordinates. [http://www.gavialliance.org/
resources/HSF_Platform_FAQ_15.01.2010.pdf]
25 Specifically paragraph 47 affirms “a State party can-
not, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-
compliance with the core obligations . . . which are non-
derogable”
26 For a rich analysis of potential perils associated with
the minimum core approach please see ref. [52]. They
argue that “while we see certain problems with the mini-
mum core approach, and in particular with the idea of
non-derogability, we believe that a cautious continuation
of the doctrine is warranted at the present time. How-
ever, it must be understood in context.” p. 495.
27 The 40 USD estimate can be found in ref. [53]. The
contents and cost of a basic package are disputed but
even a low estimate is far above what the world’s poorer
countries can afford. For a recent examination of the
costing issue please see ref. [54].
28 “Such minimum core obligations apply irrespec-
tive of the availability of resources of the country con-
cerned or any other factors and difficulties.” Para. 9, ref.
[55]. These Guidelines were prepared by a group of
legal experts to outline the emerging consensus within
the legal community in the late 1990s as to the specifics
of state responsibility and accountability under the
ICESCR.
29 Margot Salomon has advanced a more expansive
understanding of the obligation of international cooper-
ation requiring, inter alia, wealthy states to address the
structural causes of world poverty, see in particular
pages 99–104 [22].
30 This obligation to provide international assistance is
not a bottomless pit. The financial cost of this obligation
has been tied to the high income state’s available
resources and its obligations to its citizens. Striking the
right balance is a complex politically sensitive issue that
requires negotiation. The 0.7 percent of GDP goal is one
target used by the Committee when examining the con-
duct of high income state countries. However it is not
simply the volume of assistance that is important but
also the way in which it is provided; i.e. is it used in a
manner which supports or undermines human rights in
a low-income state?
31 The pitfalls of assessing when a state has expanded
the maximum of available resources have been explored
by numerous commentators including ref. [56]. Further,
establishing the appropriate benchmarks and indicators
to assess in determining whether a state is unwilling or
unable is contentious. As Tomasevski has argued in
some cases it may be more about policy than poverty.
See ref. [57]. Ensuring that the human rights of residents
of an unwilling state are fulfilled requires creative solu-
tions from the international community such as cooper-
ating with legitimate civil society groups and NGOs.
They also suggest the need for a deeper analysis and re-
form of structural impediments to the realisation of
rights as suggested by Salomon, see ref. [22].
32 Unlike “older” causes of premature death including;
malaria, tuberculosis, diarrhoea and maternal mortality,
when the first cases of AIDS appeared they posed a new
challenge to the World-how to diagnose this new dis-
ease, the cost of investing in research to find a treatment
and cure etc. Once life-saving treatment was available
another challenge arose. Would treatment be made
available to those in resource poor settings-the countries
most affected by HIV/AIDS? Citing the United States
Centers for Disease Control Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report (5 June, 1981) [25].
33 Jonathan Mann’s ground-breaking research on AIDS
led him to advocate and research on the linkages be-
tween health and respect for human rights. As Head of
the World Health Organization’s Global AIDS Program
his advocacy and research on the connection between
respect for human rights and vulnerability to HIV greatly
influenced the response to HIV/AIDS. See ref. [58]. Fol-
lowing his death the muli-layered implications of the
connection between health and human rights have been
rigoursly explored by scholars including notably Sofia
Gruskin. See ref. [59,60]
34 For further details see the Global Fund’s website
[http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/whoweare/?lang=en.]
35 As noted above the Global Fund has no country-
level presence and is designed to operate through the
CCM, a multi-sectoral country level partnership.
36 Given the recent funding crisis at the Global Fund it
can be argued that this inclusive structure is proving a
step to far for some high income states that prefer being
in the driver’s seat.
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37 For an example please see ref. [61].
38 As Benedict Kingsbury argues convincingly compli-
ance is not simply “‘correspondence of behaviour with
legal rules” [62]. He posits that “Concepts of ‘compli-
ance’ depend upon understandings of the relations of
law, behaviour; objectives, and justice.” (at 346) Thus
compliance is not a free-standing concept but derives its
meaning from different theories each of which impacts
on the definition of compliance.
39 Theories of international legal compliance remain
underdeveloped as traditionally such issues were the
purview of international relations scholars, not inter-
national lawyers.
40 See the works of international relations scholars like
[63] and the work of international lawyers like Kenneth
Abbott, e.g., [64].
41 The work of Anne-Marie Slaughter stresses the im-
portance of a state’s domestic structure and the strength
of the rule of law as determinative factors in compliance
with international law, see e.g. [65].
42 Koh’s theory evolved from his practical experience
in ‘transnational public law litigation’ against both US
and other foreign officials on behalf of victims of human
rights abuses see e.g. [66].
43 For a description and analysis of the forces shaping
this process see ref. [67]. Koh’s reference to the US
should not be understood as limiting this analysis to the
US but rather as exemplary for domestication in domes-
tic law and policies.
44 The New Haven School of International Law con-
tributed greatly to ground breaking scholarship on legal
pluralism arguing that through the interaction, interpret-
ation and enforcement behaviour of multiple diverse
communities transnational law becomes important and
even transformative [68]. See also the very influential
work of the Chayeses arguing that compliance with
international law is often best achieved through a man-
agerial approach rather than through sanction [69].
45 Goodman and Jinks’s work on the role of the accul-
turation process in influencing states compliance with
human rights law takes transnational legal process one
step further see ref. [70]. In this article they define accul-
turation as “the general process by which actors adopt
the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding
culture” (at p 726). Like Koh their work responds to a
trend in international law and human rights scholarship
to focus on coercion and persuasion based theories of
international law moving beyond asking why nations
comply with human rights law to asking how we might
better design regimes so that they enhance and facilitate
respect for human rights.
46 Koh cites the complex history of the UK’s incorpor-
ation of the European Convention on Human Rights
into domestic law as such an example.
47 For a discussion of the ‘jurisgenerative process’ see
ref. [71]. Arguing for example that “the position that
only the state creates law. . . confuses the status of inter-
pretation with the status of political domination.” (p. 43)
48 One area that we identified as problematic was the
fact that the Global Fund’s fourth largest recipient in
terms of cumulative disbursement of grants is China.
[http://www.globalhealthfacts.org/data/topic/map.aspx?
ind=60]. It is difficult to argue that China is as a country
that lacks domestic capacity to fulfil its obligations. We
thus chose to focus on the potential of the Country Co-
ordinating Mechanism as an example of a new interpret-
ation or approach to discharging this element of the
core content.
49 The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005
and the Accra Agenda for Action 2008 aim at changing
county behaviour and increasing the effectiveness of
aid to help achieve the MDGs. [http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/30/63/43911948.pdf]
50 The impact of GHIs on the health systems of low
income countries is a much debated topic and the
evidence is mixed. In some countries disease specific
interventions may have weakened other health ser-
vices whereas in other countries disease specific inter-
ventions appear to have strengthened the wider health
systems [72].
51 The reaction of civil society and activists to the
“cancellation” of a recent pledging round for the Global
Fund suggests that low income country activists and
high income country activists now view cooperation
with the Global Fund as a norm and are pushing low-
income governments to step up their health assistance
and for high-income governments to fund the Global
Fund. See [http://www.aidspan.org/documents/gfo/GFO-
Issue-174.htm] [http://www.aidspan.org/documents/gfo/
GFO-Issue-170.pdf]
52 Politicians in many high income state countries
choose to use the Global Fund as the main vehicle for
funding ARV treatment in the Global South instead of
shifting towards bilateral aid structures to provide such
funding.
53 In its 2010 election manifesto the British Conserva-
tive party pledged to enshrine the 0.7% of GNI to ODA
in law but as of March 2012 the Conservative led British
Government had failed to do so.
54 The more conservative approach discussed by
Skogly see ref. [14], namely; the obligation to ensure that
their development assistance does not violate economic
and social rights, is more in line with current high in-
come state policy e.g. of the UK’s DFID and Sweden’s
SIDA.
55 Balakrishnan Rajagopal calls for international law-
yers to engage in social movements and activism and for
them to use international law and arenas to expand the
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space available for transformative politics and move
away from its Western, elitist, male-centered imperial
past [73].
56 In discussing the potential of human rights
Schrecker et al. assert, “their theoretical strength as a
challenge to the norms of the global marketplace” and
stress “the importance of collaboration between those
working in human rights and in social determinants of
health to define common objectives and develop re-
search programs and advocacy strategies for moving
from compelling theory to effective practice” [74].
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